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The Institute of Medicine’s recent report, Organ Donation:
Opportunities for Action, studies the current problems facing
organ donation in the USA, making suggestions for quality
improvement and analyzing various proposals of incentivized
donation and presumed consent (PC). Although the report
deals with the donation of several solid organs, this mini
review examines the findings from the perspective of kidney
transplantation. The committee’s recommendations to move
from circulatory to neurologic criteria for cadaveric donation
and to increase opportunities for donor decision making are
prudent. We agree with the committee’s arguments against
providing incentives for donation because of the inherent
distributional inequalities and imperfect information; the
intrinsic difficulties in establishing market equilibrium for
such heterogeneous and perishable goods; the implied
commoditization of the human body; and the inadequate
data regarding the long-term risks of living donation.
However, we question the committee’s firm opposition to PC,
especially given recent data from 22 European countries
showing a 25–30% increase in organ supply attributable
to a PC policy. If this simple change in the default position
on donation has the potential to increase organ supply,
decrease the need for living donation, reduce the burden
on grieving families, maintain familial authority over the
deceased, and respect patient autonomy, at least a pilot
program of PC seems warranted.
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The Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy
of Sciences recently released a comprehensive report, Organ
Donation: Opportunities for Action, which analyzes the
current difficulties in organ procurement.1 In studying what
has become a chronic shortage for the 490 000 patients
waiting for an organ, the committee operated under four
principles: a common stake in a trustworthy system, the need
to appeal to proper motivations, respect for the dignity
of individuals and their rights/wishes, and fairness for all
participants in the system. The committee formally limited
themselves to only solid organ donation, analyzing possible
suggestions to improve donation of all kinds of solid organs
and the inherent ethical flaws, possible inequalities, and
ultimate cost effectiveness of these general proposals. As 70%
of solid transplants conducted today are renal, the majority of
policy suggested in the report is directly applicable to kidney
transplants. This mini review will focus on the implications
of the report for those working in the field of renal
transplantation. Although the IOM has prepared a compre-
hensive and accessible document, a few of its recommenda-
tions, most notably its continued opposition to incentives
and presumed consent (PC), will likely be controversial.
Although the IOM makes a reasonable case for opposing
incentives, it may be too conservative on PC, especially given
recent empirical data from Europe.
The committee’s first three recommendations for enhan-
cing donation are prudent and logical: (1) moving to a
systems approach (i.e. disseminating best practices, improv-
ing quality assessment, and integrating end of life care to
donation); (2) expanding the donor pool by moving from
circulatory to neurologic criteria; and (3) improved educa-
tion and decision-making opportunities. However, the IOM
sidestepped some of the fundamental issues concerning living
donation. The committee did issue recommendations to
provide potential donors with independent advocate teams
and risk/benefit analyses, and called for the establishment of
living donor registries to provide concrete data on the short-
and long-term consequences of live donation. But instead
of providing a comprehensive analysis of the myriad types
of live donor–recipient relationships, each one fraught
with unique ethical complications, the committee simply
recommended that yet another committee study this issue.
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The need for clear guidance is dire and has been consistently
increasing: between 1988 and 2005, the percentage of live
donations increased from 20% to nearly 40%.
Several notable economists, including Nobel laureate Gary
Becker and his colleague Julio Elias, have called for the
creation of various incentive schemes to improve rates of
organ donation. We strongly agree with the committee’s
steadfast refutation of all the major arguments for moving to
an incentive-based system. On the supply side, the committee
points to the inherent issues of distributional inequity and
imperfect information. With regard to incentivized cadaveric
donation, it is not the donor who would benefit monetarily,
but rather his/her family members. In addition to the
widely existing cultural norms against profit from tissue,
the committee also debunks the possibility of any kind of
‘futures market’ being derived in the organ trade because of
the inherent uncertainty in such an enterprise. On the
demand side of this ‘market,’ they mainly point to issues of
equality: many of the poor who would stand to ‘sell’ into this
system are not in a position to reap the benefits of such a
marketplace. It is hardly fair to ask an individual to donate an
organ for profit when he has no access to primary care,
let alone to sophisticated organ transplantation for himself.
The pricing of organs, despite Becker and Elias’ estimations,
is highly heterogeneous and highly differentiated so a
market equilibrium would be difficult to reach. Furthermore,
the IOM points out that transplant patients (‘buyers’) are
inevitably inelastic (i.e. unable to modulate their behavior on
the basis of market prices) and rarely in a sound mental state
to make safe, equitable decisions.
The committee rightly identifies the matters of social
taboos, quality assurance, traditional family rights over the
deceased, and the commoditization of the human body as
additional problems with incentivized donation. They also
identify the difficulty in separating an incentive as a token of
gratitude as opposed to a payment for a commodity. Another
variation on incentives, paying-for-registration, is not a
reliable means of determining the consent of the donor. In
practice, the motivation of an individual getting an $8 rebate
on his or her driver’s license fees for donor registration (as is
the case in Georgia) is hardly the scenario in which we
want Americans to consider the serious consequences of
organ donation. On the issue of preferential access to the
donor pool for registered donors, the committee recognizes
that this would likely reduce the waiting list by increasing
donors and reducing recipients and potentially be ‘fair.’
However, we do not yet have conclusive data on the long-
term effects on living donors, and there would be substantial
difficulty in implementing this fairly among all strata of
society because of informational and socioeconomic barriers.
Similarly, there is bound to be adverse selection as those most
likely to sign up may be the least able to donate.
Many of these largely theoretical arguments opposing
incentives that are presented by the committee were recently
empirically validated by a study by Rodrigue et al.2 These
authors found that of 561 next-of-kin who either consented
or refused organ donation, 91.4% of respondents said that
incentives would not have affected their decision to donate.
Although non-donors were more likely to be swayed to
donate than donors (12%), a sizeable number of the donors
(6%) would not have donated had there been financial
incentive. The authors also found that the incentives were
more compelling to the poorer and less educated respon-
dents, as is asserted by the committee.2 We thus agree with
the committee’s recommendation opposing a pilot study of
incentives because of the clearly articulated concerns over
distributional inequalities, imperfect information, the com-
moditization of the human body, and the continuing lack of
long-term information on the risks of living donation.
Although we believe the committee’s argument against
incentivized donation is prudent, they are far too conserva-
tive in their firm opposition to PC. At one point in the
report, the committee asks of moving to PC, ‘whether it is
wise to seek a dramatic change in a system that works fairly
well, although not perfectly.’ We believe that a system that has
490 000 people waiting and thousands dying annually is far
from perfect, and is in dire need of a new direction.
Despite the committee’s continued opposition, there seems
to be quite convincing evidence that changing the default
option for organ donation could increase the number of
available organs considerably. The oft-touted experience in
Belgium shows that subsequent to a PC law in 1986
(which was widely practiced ‘softly,’ to include family
consultation and opportunity to override the default
post-mortem), there was an 86% increase in donations
within year, which was maintained while live donations fell.
Furthermore, although in the 6 years after the law was
enacted mortal traffic injuries decreased by 50%, the number
of organ donors still doubled.3
Even more convincing was a recent cross-country
economic analysis by Abadie and Gay4 that analyzed 22
European countries over a 10-year period. In this study, while
controlling for religious belief, common or civil law, number
of deaths in motor vehicle accidents, cerebro-vascular deaths,
and social norms toward donation (measured by blood
donation rates), the authors still found that donation
rates were 25–30% higher in countries practicing PC.4 In
addition, a poll of the International Society for Heart and
Lung Transplantation (ISHLT)/Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Cardiac Therapies (FACT) shows that 75% of global
experts support PC and 39% maintain that it is the most
effective means of improving donation rates.5 The British
Medical Association has also recommended that Great
Britain move to a soft PC policy.6
Yet in its report, the IOM committee analyzed and rejected
both routine removal of kidneys and PC policies. Although
the committee implicitly condones the routine removal of
corneas in several states, it creates very weak arguments as to
how this is ethically condonable when routine organ removal
is not. Essentially the committee argues that in comparison to
solid organ donation, corneas are removed in fewer numbers,
have less ‘vascularity’, and are less ‘embedded’ in the donor. It
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also cites the ‘value of individualism.’ None of these are truly
ethically defensible rationales for distinguishing between the
removal of corneas and the removal of organs, except for the
likely public outcry that would accompany the latter.
At the center of PC is a simple switch of the default
position from non-consent to consent. Johnson and Gold-
stein7 explored the importance of defaults in decision
making, specifically with respect to PC, and suggest that
defaults influence decisions in three key ways. For example,
in an informed consent (opt-in) system, individuals may
believe that: (1) they are being recommended not to donate
(default is the policy’s implicit suggestion); (2) it is too much
of a hassle to sign up resulting in dismal societal registration
rates (opting in requires effort); and (3) volunteering to
donate would imply some unforeseen sacrifice on their part,
like substandard trauma care (defaults are the status quo and
substitutions require a tradeoff).7 In their small survey, the
authors show that the number of willing donors under PC is
much higher than in an opt-in policy, presumably because of
the assumed attitudes toward the default. In the US/UK,
50% of families refuse organ donation for their loved ones
when approached after death whereas only 20–30% refuse in
Spain and France, countries with a PC system. Transplant
coordinators in Europe are able to approach these families as
likely donors rather than default-non-donors. And, as
Johnson and Goldstein7 have shown, the power of the
default in this conversation is not to be underestimated.
Another fundamental issue for PC is autonomy. The
committee cites preliminary data from the 2005 National
Survey of Organ Donation, which suggest that 30% of
respondents would ‘opt out’ in a PC policy, which could
possibly lead to a decrease in organ availability. The
argument is that under the current system people do not
forbid family from making decisions, so family members can
be coaxed post-mortem. Thus, by allowing individuals to
actually choose in a PC system, and not counting on the
emotionally charged altruism of the family, some of this 30%
will be lost. Another hypothetical argument presented is that
there are individuals who would like to donate, never register
out of fear of inadequate care, but ultimately donate
post-mortem. The committee suggests that these individuals
would actively opt out in droves under PC. This is entirely
conjecture as there is no empirical evidence presented to
show that such an effect would happen in sufficient numbers
to negate the benefits of the policy.
Although these arguments suggest that PC allows ‘too
much autonomy,’ other critics of PC argue that the implied
default does not adequately respect the right of the individual
to make a choice about his/her donation. We contend that a
system that frequently prevents willing donors from donating
is as flawed as one that could inadvertently force non-donors
to donate. Given the 1993 Gallup poll on Americans’
preferences on donation, PC would allow more Americans
to execute their stated intentions over their bodies. Whereas
86% of Americans support transplantations and 69% want to
donate their organs, only 28% actually manage to sign their
donor cards.8 Although it may be argued that forcing
individuals to make decisions about their donation prefer-
ences undermines the principle of autonomy, some authors
have asked whether this ‘right to silence’ is a liberty that
comes at too high a price.9–11 Citizens are expected to share
sacrifice for the benefit of society both during life, for
example, by registering with the Selective Service, and even
after life, in the form of a sizeable, mandatory tax for those
Americans with sufficiently valued estates. The committee
prizes the patient’s right to silence to such a degree that
it too quickly dismisses the counterargument: societies
should be allowed to mandate some personal sacrifice if the
expected outcome, such as the saving of thousands of lives, is
great enough.
It is true that for this policy to be ethically practiced, a
large and comprehensive education campaign would have
to be undertaken for individuals to truly make an informed
decision and to promote cultural acceptance. The IOM
questions whether this would be too costly. But the potential
impact on the organ supply alone warrants such a cost.
Irrespective, should not individuals be just as informed when
deciding to opt out by default in our current system, as they
would be by choice under PC? Furthermore, is it not in the
medical establishment’s best interest to dispel decades of
distrust of its role during organ donation, resuscitation,
and death? And if, as the European data suggest, this policy
increases organ supply, reduces the burden on living
donation, reduces the burden on grieving families, continues
familial authority over the deceased, and more adequately
exercises patient autonomy, why does the committee so
vehemently oppose even a pilot study?
The IOM presents a compelling, comprehensive, and
accessible report with excellent suggestions for quality and
efficiency improvement. Despite its lack of guidance on living
donation, the committee presents a carefully articulated
counterargument to incentivized organ donation. However,
its continued opposition to even trials of PC legislation is
misinformed in its American exceptionalism and disregard
for empirical evidence from other nations.
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